Statement of Sean Kennedy
Director of Policy and Research, Citizens Against Government Waste
Before the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability
June 9, 2026
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Sean Kennedy, and I am the Director of Policy and Research for Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW), a nonpartisan organization founded in 1984 to build support for implementation of President Ronald Reagan’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, also known as the Grace Commission. By highlighting wasteful Pentagon expenditures like a $436 hammer and recommending improvements in procurement like establishing the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, the Grace Commission inspired members of Congress to establish the bipartisan and bicameral Grace Caucus, which was built up to 199 members in 1994.
The Department of Defense (DOD) accounts for approximately one-sixth of federal spending, and procurement makes up around 17 percent of its budget.[1] Generally, the Pentagon has demonstrated a preference for big ticket weapons systems with lengthy development periods. However, despite significant costs, results have not always been up to par. A June 2025 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the DOD plans to spend $2.4 trillion to acquire its 106 costliest weapons, and on average it takes 12 years to provide even initial capability.[2] This lumbering pace is well behind the speed of technological advancements in modern warfare.
The weapon system most emblematic of this slow, costly approach to procurement is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which provides unmatched capability, but has been fraught with delays and significant expenses. Total acquisition costs exceed $442 billion, which is 90 percent greater than the initial estimate, and total lifetime costs will exceed $2 trillion.[3]
The JSF has been plagued by a staggering array of persistent issues leading to not only cost overruns, but also lackluster readiness rates and a readiness gap, where older aircraft meant to be replaced are aging. The JSF’s poor return has two main drivers. First, development and acquisition occurred simultaneously. When problems were identified or upgrades developed, contractors needed to make changes to aircraft that were already assembled, inflating costs and causing delays.
Second, the nature of the contract the DOD reached for the JSF undercut the result. Under the deal, the contractor was solely responsible for the development and maintenance of many of the aircraft’s subsystems and retained control over technical data and intellectual property. A September 21, 2023, GAO report determined that the DOD’s failure to negotiate access to data severely hamstrung efforts to maintain aircraft, adding to costs, delaying fixes, and contributing to woeful readiness rates.[4]
Because of a lack of access to technical data, “depot personnel not only cannot fix the part, but they cannot learn and understand how to fix the part.”[5] Support equipment used to make repairs at depots frequently breaks, but because it is proprietary, the DOD must rely on contractors for fixes, which can take months.[6]
What’s worse, underperforming JSF subsystems could not be replaced with alternatives. This created a “a perpetual monopoly,” according to former Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall.[7]
As it initiates substantial investment in the next generation of aircraft, it is vital to correct these mistakes. Thankfully, a different and promising approach is being pursued for the F-47. By using a modular or open framework, the government selects a prime contractor and can choose subsystems from other sources, allowing the replacement of underachieving aspects of the new weapons system. This will enable faster adoption of new technology and should avoid the many pitfalls inherent in relying on one contractor to develop and control all aspects of new aircraft.
The DOD must also apply the lessons of modern conflict to expedite its procurement process. The rapid pace of drone advancements in the Ukraine war, with iteration occurring within weeks, renders the typical prolonged DOD development path unworkable.
Moreover, the U.S. military currently defends against incoming drone attacks in an unsustainable way, demonstrating the shortcomings of the Pentagon’s preference for expensive equipment and slow timelines. In the conflict with Iran, the U.S. commonly used a Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile costing more than $3 million to shoot down a Shahed drone costing approximately $35,000.[8] To defend itself against similar drones, Ukraine has employed interceptor drones that cost around $4,000.[9]
The DOD must adopt a much faster timescale and drive down costs. This process would be expedited by seeking commercial solutions as the first option. The Trump administration has stressed this point through several executive orders and policy memos, but institutional inertia has stymied similar efforts in the past.
In conclusion, the DOD’s propensity for lengthy and expensive procurement timelines have resulted in often highly capable but typically costly weapons systems and is not sustainable. By agreeing to more favorable contracts, learning the lessons of today’s conflicts, and empowering the private sector, the Pentagon can set itself on a more efficient and effective procurement pathway.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[1] Congressional Budget Office, “Defense and National Security,” October 1, 2025, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-108528; Office of Management and Budget, “Historical Tables,” accessed June 4, 2026, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-resources/budget/historical-tables/.
[2] Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Defense Acquisition Reform,” June 11, 2025, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-108528.
[3] GAO, “F-35 Sustainment: Costs Continue to Rise While Planned Use and Availability Have Decreased,” April 15, 2024, https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24106703.pdf.
[4] GAO, “F-35 Aircraft: DOD and the Military Services Need to Reassess the Future Sustainment Strategy,” September 21, 2023, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105341.pdf.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Stephen Losey, “GAO blasts contractor-led F-35 maintenance as costly, slow,” Defense News, September 22, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/09/22/gao-blasts-contractor-led-f-35-maintenance-as-costly-slow/.
[7] Losey, “GAO blasts contractor-led F-35 maintenance as costly, slow.”
[8] Ashley Cai, Jeremy White, and John Ismay, “How Iran’s Cheap, Low-Tech Drones Have Cost the U.S.,” The New York Times, April 18, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/04/18/world/middleeast/iran-us-war-drones-cost.html.
[9] Katie Livingstone, “Novel interceptor drones bend air-defense economics in Ukraine’s favor,” Defense News, March 5, 2026, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/03/05/novel-interceptor-drones-bend-air-defense-economics-in-ukraines-favor/.